| United States v. Lara | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Supreme Court of the United States |
||||||
| Argued January 21, 2004 Decided April 19, 2004 |
||||||
| Full case name | United States v. Billy Jo Lara | |||||
| Citations | 541 U.S. 193 (more) 124 S. Ct. 1628; 158 L. Ed. 2d 420 |
|||||
| Prior history | United States v. Lara, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20182 (D.N.D. 2001). ; United States v. Lara, 294 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. N.D. 2002). ; United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003). | |||||
| Holding | ||||||
| Reversed, held that double jeopardy does not attach since the tribe and the United States were separate sovereigns. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
|
||||||
| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | J. Breyer, joined by C.J. Rehnquist, JJ. Stevens, O'Conner and Ginsburg | |||||
| Concurrence | J. Stevens | |||||
| Concurrence | J. Kennedy | |||||
| Concurrence | J. Thomas | |||||
| Dissent | J. Souter, joined by J. Scalia | |||||
| Laws applied | ||||||
| U.S. Const. Art. II, §2; U.S. Const. Amend. V; 25 U.S.C. 1301(2) | ||||||
United States v. Billy Jo Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) was a United States Supreme Court case which held that both the United States and a Native American (Indian) tribe could prosecute an Indian for the same acts that constituted crimes in both jurisdictions. The court held that both the United States and the tribe were separate sovereigns, therefore double jeopardy did not attach.[1]
The defendant, Billy Jo Lara, was charged for acts that were criminal offenses under both the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe's laws and the federal United States Code. Lara pleaded guilty to the tribal charges, but claimed double jeopardy against the federal charges. The United States Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy did not apply to Lara since “the successive prosecutions were brought by separate and distinct sovereign bodies”[2]
Contents |
On June 13, 2001, Billy Jo Lara, an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians located in northern North Dakota, was charged with public intoxication and arrested while on the Spirit Lake Reservation, over which the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe has territorial sovereignty. The Spirit Lake Reservation is approximately 90 miles (140 km) south of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. After the initial arrest, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officer Bryon Swan took Lara to the station where Lara was informed of a Sioux order excluding him from the reservation. Lara then struck Swan, who as a BIA officer was considered both a tribal officer and a federal law enforcement officer.[3]
Following his arrest, the tribal court of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe charged Lara, a non-member, with assaulting the arresting officers. Lara pleaded guilty to the tribal charge. Soon after, federal prosecutors charged Lara with assault on a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the charge based on double jeopardy and other grounds. The Federal District Court denied the motion and Lara entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal.[3]
Lara appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the Tribal Court obtained its authority from an act of Congress and that both the Tribal Court and the Federal Court derived its power from the same sovereign. A three-judge panel of that court affirmed the decision of the District Court, holding that the tribe derived its power from its own retained sovereignty that was separate from the sovereignty of the United States.[4]
Lara then requested a rehearing en banc by the full court. The request was granted, and the full court reversed the decision of the three-judge panel, ordering that the Federal indictment be dismissed on the grounds of double jeopardy. While the court noted that the Fifth Amendment allowed prosecution by two separate sovereigns, such as the Federal government and a state government, it found that an Indian tribe derived its authority to prosecute offenders from Federal law. This meant that double jeopardy attached.[5] The United States then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to hear the case.[1]
Lara argued that an Indian tribe had no inherent sovereignty in regards to non-member Indians, but only the power that Congress decided to give the tribe, citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Lara argued that since the tribe had no inherent sovereignty, it could only prosecute a non-member Indian based upon Federal sovereignty, which would make a subsequent Federal prosecution a violation of the prohibition of double jeopardy.[6][7] Lara's position was supported by amicus curiae briefs filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,[8] Lewis County, Idaho (along with several other counties),[9] the Citizen's Equal Rights Foundation,[10] and T. Morris and R. Morris (individual Indians).[11]
Ted Olson, the Solicitor General for the United States, argued that Congress, in response to the Duro decision acted to "recognize and affirm" the Indian tribe's inherent power to enforce its criminal laws against Indians of other tribes. Olson noted that the Wheeler decision clearly stated that a tribe could prosecute a tribal member for a crime and that the Federal government could subsequently prosecute for the same criminal acts without invoking double jeopardy if the actions of the accused violated Federal law. He argued that to bar prosecution was to further strip tribes of their tribal sovereignty.[7][12][13] The United States was supported by amicus briefs filed by the State of Washington and seven other states,[14] the State of Idaho and five other states,[15] the National Congress of American Indians,[16] and eighteen Indian tribes.[17]
Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion of the court on April 19, 2004. Breyer stated that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution granted Congress "plenary and exclusive" power to legislate in respect to the Indian tribes. This power included the ability to both restrict tribal powers or to relax such restrictions. The earlier decisions in Duro, Wheeler, and Oliphant dealt with cases where Congress had restricted a tribe's inherent powers. Breyer noted that since there is nothing in the Constitution or established precedent that prohibits Congress from relaxing such restrictions, Congress may do so. Since the power exercised by the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe was that of inherent tribal sovereignty, double jeopardy did not attach.[1][2]
This conclusion allowed both courts to prosecute Lara. Since separate sovereign bodies had filed the charges, double jeopardy did not apply to Lara’s case.[2] The decision of the Circuit Court was reversed.
Justice John Paul Stevens issued a concurring opinion that noted that the Indian tribes have a stronger claim on inherent sovereign powers than do individual states.[1] Justice Anthony Kennedy issued a concurrence that stated that Congress was very careful to base the changes to the statute on inherent tribal powers but was concerned that the court did not address the question of the Equal Protection Clause.[1] Justice Clarence Thomas issued a concurring opinion noting that a delegation of prosecutorial power is always to an executive branch and that the tribes are not part of any executive branch of the Federal government. Therefore the case hinges on the tribes' inherent sovereignty, and based on precedent, the tribes possess that power.[1]
Justice David Souter issued a dissenting opinion from the court, which referenced prior cases dealing with sovereignty and jurisdiction, from the decision made in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) to the opinion made in South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993). Souter stated that the decision in the Lara case did not align with precedent established in previous cases.[1]
Souter claims this dissonance in court decisions will lead to confusion, stating: “And confusion, I fear, will be the legacy of today’s decision, for our failure to stand by what we have previously said reveals that our conceptualizations of sovereignty and dependent sovereignty are largely rhetorical.”[1] Souter concluded that he would stand by the decisions made in Duro and Oliphant.[1]
This case has been the subject of numerous law review articles since the decision was made (as of May 2010, it has been cited over 190 times). It has been noted that Indians are very integrated across tribal boundaries, intermarrying across tribes and share child and medical care services across tribes. Lara was an example of this; he married a Spirit Lake Sioux woman and moved to that reservation before his exclusion by the tribe.[18] It was noted that as "As "domestic dependent nations," American-Indian tribes possess criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country that is 'complete, inherent, and exclusive,' except as limited by Congress."[18][19] The decision was praised by many seeking more self-determination by tribes. They noted that Lara had been in numerous altercations with the tribal police at Spirit Lake, for intoxication, spousal abuse, and resisting arrest. It was only when the tribe ran out of options did it issue an exclusion order to bar him from the reservation.[20][21]
Another position taken was that the decision was in the long run a bad for tribal sovereignty, since it affirms the ability of Congress to relax or to restrict tribal powers. The opinion of Justice Thomas was especially telling in this, as Thomas had opined that plenary power and tribal sovereignty were mutually exclusive.[1][22][23]
The case has also been widely covered in books and news media. Tribal court authority has been altered by the U.S. government for decades and the jurisdictional powers have not been untouched. In Justice Thomas's conclusion at the end of Billy Jo Lara's case, he even states that "History points in both directions."[24] Thomas goes further to say that "Federal Indian policy, is, to say the least, schizophrenic." [24] Thomas's statements directly address not only the Supreme Court's confusion on where Federal Indian Policy is headed in the future, but also where it is in 2010.[25] As Justice Souter stated in his dissent, this remains "an area peculiarly susceptible to confusion."[26]